Project Statement
In July 2001, international relations took an unusual turn. The US, the lone global superpower and indispensable leader in international institution-building since 1944 (For excellent recent analyses on the unipolarity of todays world and asymmetric US power, see Haass 2005; Ikenberry 2002; Walt 2005), had announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change a few months earlier. With this announcement, it was expected that Kyoto would die and that new negotiations would usher in a new US-friendly set of institutions. Yet, by the end of July, all other economically advanced countries (the so-called Annex I countries), except for Australia, had decided to ignore the US withdrawal and to press ahead anyway. The European Union (EU) took the first step at its Gothenburg Summit in June, taking the decision to take the role of climate hegemon and to lobby other countries in the process (Vig and Faure 2004; Vogler and Bretherton 2006). Despite its tight economic integration with the US, Canada followed suit. Japan hesitated, torn between its close alliance with the US and clear economic interests on the one hand and EU and civil society pressures on the other hand. By the end of July, however, Japan had also crossed the Rubicon and decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus to participate in the creation of a new international institution in the absence of the US. Russia later joined the trio, enabling Kyoto to take force as international law in February 2005. A major new and standard-setting institution was born, in spite of the opposition of the global hegemon.
This pattern is not an isolated one. The same process occurred with the ratification of the 1998 Statutes of Rome and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. While the US was initially involved in the drafting of statutes and had signed them, it later decided to remove its signature and to launch an active campaign against the ICC. Yet, in spite of the undisputed status of the US at the sole superpower and the unprecedented asymmetry of power in the world today, other participants (except Japan, despite positive words) merely shrugged the US opposition off and pushed ahead anyway (Amnesty International Japan 2002; Amnesty International. 2002; Bassiouni 1999; Bekou and Cryer 2004; Broomhall 2003; Cassese, Gaeta and Jones 2002; Driscoll, Zompetti and Zompetti 2004; Glasius 2006; Lattanzi and Schabas 1999; Malone and Khong 2003; Meissner 2005; Nolte 2003; Sands 2003; Stubbins 2004). Meanwhile, Canada, Japan, Norway, and the EU have all been advancing the concept of "human security" and lobbying for such notions to be integrated into policy deliberations at the UN level (Malone and Khong 2003; Remacle 2005). The Ottawa treaty to ban personal landmines (1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on their Destruction) was signed, ratified, and implemented, in spite of opposition from the US (as well as opposition from China and Russia) (As of October 2005, some of the important non-signatories include the USA, Cuba, India, North and South Korea, Vietnam, China, Laos, Singapore, Russia, Finland, Georgia, and Armenia. Only four countries are still using landmines: Russia, Myanmar, Nepal, Georgia. Interestingly, the US is the largest donor to mine action. The next largest donors are, in order, the EU Commission, Norway, Japan, the UK, Canada, and Germany(International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2005). Again, the coalition driving the ban included Canada, key European countries, and Japan (as well as South Africa, Norway, and Brazil) (Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin 1998; Hubert 2000; International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2005; Vines and Thompson 1999).
In a different field, on October 20, 2005, 148 countries adopted a new cultural diversity treaty negotiated within the framework of UNESCO. The treaty, led by Canada and France aims at helping "countries defend domestic culture from the homogenizing influence of globalization" (ITCSD Report, October 26, 2005). Only two countries opposed the treaty: the US and Israel. Australia, Honduras, Liberia, and Nicaragua abstained. The treaty affirms the sovereign right of countries to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions, insisting that this must be taken into account by the WTO and by other treaties. The US argues that the treaty is vague and can be used to block trade in cultural goods and services. Other examples include emerging norms of development assistance, assistance policies, humanitarian interventions (Finnemore 2003), refugee rights (Barnett and Finnemore 2004), and human rights.
These cases exemplify two puzzling trends in international affairs since the late 1990s. The first one is an expansion of multilateral institution-building into new arenas. While the post-war period saw the creation of effective global institutions in the field of economic cooperation and development (IMF, World Bank, WTO), security (disarmament treaties), and human rights (beginning with the International Declaration of Human Rights contained in the UN Charter), the 1990s and 2000s have seen the expansion of this trend into the arenas of environment, human security, and human rights and culture. The development of these international institutions includes formal legal treaties, codes of conducts, and norms and practices that shape behavior. In this project, institutions are defined as rules of the games in the North-Aoki tradition and encompass this whole range of possibilities (North (1990) defined institutions as "rules of the game" and "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." According to North, institutions serve to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. At the same time, institutions are "created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules" (16). North includes a limited analysis of institutional change. According to him, changes in relative prices lead key actors to renegotiate contracts and change rules in an incremental way (86). Aoki (2001) goes much further in his monumental work, Comparative Institutional Analysis, as his analysis integrates the role of cognitive aspects. Aoki defines an institution as an equilibrium outcome of a game. More specifically, he sees institutions as a "self-sustaining system of shared beliefs" (10).)
The second trend is a new political pattern in the creation of these institutions. To the surprise of many, as the US decided that institution-building beyond the realms of economy (trade, finance) and hard security (anti-terrorism, non-proliferation) was not in its interest and should be halted, the process just continued anyway. In the cockpit driving the continued trend, one can find key middle powers (For classic work on middle powers, see (Chapnick 2005; Cooper 1997; Cooper and Higgott 1990; Finlayson 1988; Finlayson and Weston 1990; Holbraad 1984; Loo 2005; Nossal 1991; Ping 2005; Protheroe 1988; Rudengren et al. 1995; Welsh 2004; Wood 1988); in particular, an emergent European Union aiming to project a new common identity (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Manners 2000), a transforming Japan (Curtis 2004; Davis 1993; Fukushima 1999; Hughes 2004; Inoguchi 2001; Kawashima 2003; Pempel 1998), and a Canada always keen to adhere to multilateralism. Historically, the United States have inspired and led the trend of global institution-building in a classic hegemonic pattern (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984). In the late 1990s, however, leadership in new institution-building appears to have shifted from the U.S. to a group of countries committed to multilateral activism on a range on non-military agendas (Hence the concept of "civilian powers" (Telo 2005)). Countries such as Canada, the EU, and Japan appear as the vanguard of this development, although their cooperation does not extend to all issue areas and they are joined in their efforts by varying coalitions of other countries. In the post-cold war period, these countries have increasingly taken common positions on global issues (particularly related to the environment, human security, and human rights) and allowed major institutional change to occur by the sheer weight of this convergent pattern. On some issues, this "trilateral" cooperation is visible ex ante, on others it only appears in the final stages of institution-building through a commonality in positions. It is also interesting to note that three other major powers, namely China, Russia, and India, have not yet played a driving role in the process of institution-building. Depending on issue-areas, they have often lent support to the process (for example on the Kyoto protocol) but have neither been first-movers nor essential actors.
The observation of these two trends in the pattern of multilateral institution-building leads to three main research questions in this book:
- What explains the intensification (in depth and spread) of multilateral institution-building since the mid-1990s?
- What is the role played by affluent middle powers in this process at this juncture of time, particularly the role played by Canada, the EU, and Japan)?
- Why have they been willing and capable to play this rol
The book therefore focuses on two levels of analysis:
- The generation of multilateral institutions (treaties, practices, and norms) as a dependent variable, and the related study of the roles of the EU, Japan, and Canada (individually and collectively) in shaping this process.
- And the role and behavior of the EU, Japan, Canada (and other middle powers) as dependent variable and various political processes as causes for this behavior.
A Crucial Puzzle at the Global Level
Explanations of recently intensified institution-building crucially matter for our understanding of international relations in at least three ways. First, as eloquently argued by Haass (2005), the post-cold war period has represented a unique opportunity for further institutionalization at the global level for a move away from pure great power politics. Influential voices in the US have acknowledged this opportunity as well. Understanding the processes whereby such an institutionalization has progressed and how this affects outcomes is essential.
Second, international institution-building represents an unexpected pattern and highlights new cleavages. Does it represent an extension of Kagan's dichotomy ("Europe is from Venus, America is from Mars" ((Kagan 2003), whereby Canada and Japan are also from Venus? Does it represent a successful cluster around Europe's rising vision of a model for international relations (Reid 2004; Rifkin 2004)? This project enlarges the non-warrior like pole beyond Europe and redefines it as Minervian: strong institutions and limited, but wise use of force. Interestingly, voting patterns at the UN General Assembly confirms the hypothesis of a growing concordance among European countries, Canada, and Japan. Table 1 presents succinct data on the per cent degree of overlap between the US and several powers in UN General Assembly voting. It shows that the voting patterns of Canada, Japan, and Germany have converged to very similar positions.
| Overall | Arms Control | Human Rights | Middle East | Important Votes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 49 | 57 | 63 | 44 | 58 |
| Canada | 49 | 64 | 62 | 46 | 64 |
| Franece | 56 | 82 | 59 | 44 | 50 |
| Germany | 49 | 69 | 57 | 44 | 50 |
| UK | 57 | 82 | 57 | 44 | 50 |
Source: US State Department
In particular, Japan's voting pattern at the UN since 1997 exhibits a decreasing degree o of concordance with U.S. votes, a trend that predated the Bush administration's unilateralism. Overall voting concordance with the U.S. decreased from 67% in 1997 to 59% in 2000 and 49% in 2002. Unlike patterns in the mid-1990s, the U.S.-Japan divergence now extends to all major issues: Cuba, Palestine, disarmament, and human rights. These results go against common knowledge against the strength of the US-Japan partnership at the United Nations.
Further, the creation of new global institutions since the mid-1990s highlights new patterns of cooperation. Cooperation seems neither coordinated by the usual post-war hegemon (the US), even in its most glorious hour; nor normative; nor even orchestrated by the states involved. The concordant pattern between poles such as Japan, the EU, and Canada comes about despite enduring differences in regional interests, types of capitalist systems, partisan color of governing coalitions, and public opinion.
A Crucial Question for the Study of the EU, Japan, and Canada
The question of why a country would position itself in support of multilateral institution-building despite opposition by the US (in most cases) resonates differently in each national case.
For Canada, multilateralism has been a dominant foreign policy theme since the 1970s. Yet, Canadian foreign policy is also marked by deepening economic integration with the US in the wake of NAFTA. How sustainable is a multilateral foreign policy that goes against US interests or at least does not follow the US lead? Under what conditions does Canada choose to adhere to or to abandon multilateralism?
For Europe, the pursuit of global institution-building is deeply embedded in its quest for a growing role as an international policy actor. This quest is intimately linked to its own state-building process, especially when public opinion reveals strong expectations for a common European foreign policy. Key nation-states such as France, Germany, and the UK have become more willing to cede part of their sovereign rights and agenda-setting status in international negotiations. The situation is radically different from that of the 1980s. As the EU integrates its foreign policy, which actors shape different components of its foreign policy agenda? Is the multilateral agenda the result of the capture of Europe's foreign policy voice by small states such as the Nordic countries and the Netherlands? Is it driven by Germany, or by the European Commission and the European Parliament (On the EU's new role, see Reid 2004; Rifkin 2004; Schnabel and Rocca 2005)?
As for Japan, the pursuit of multilateral institutional-building lies right on the core fault line of Japanese foreign policy: the tension between realism and idealism. One the one hand, the US-Japan alliance has provided the main anchor for Japanese foreign policy since the Yoshida doctrine of the early 1950 (See, among others, Curtis 2000; Green and Mochizuki 1998; Kawashima 2003; Mochizuki 1991, 1995, 1997). On the other hand, since the 1950s, Japan has professed an "UN-centered foreign policy", one where Japan has sought to work for global peace and global harmony. In the 1990s, Japan has worked hard to project a new image and to demonstrate leadership by supporting the UN, being proactive on human rights, development, disarmament, and environment, and most recently by contributing troops and generous aid to the reconstruction of post-conflict societies (Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq). This ongoing tension between Realism/ focus on US alliance on the one hand and Idealism/Pacifism/UN focus on the other hand may go back a long way in time. It is worth remembering the crucial role played by Nitobe Inazo in the creation of the League of Nations in the 1920s while Japan was veering toward imperialism.
In the 1990s, both tendencies seem to be strengthening at the same time. On the one hand, as brilliantly argued by Michael Green (2001), Japan pursues a visibly realist policy in its relations with China and Russia. Currently, various policy actors are pushing for a militarily stronger Japan (as seen in the current build-up of the navy and air force) accompanied by a strengthening of the US-Japan alliance (Afghanistan, Iraq, Missile Defense, Guideline Reforms) (See also the excellent analysis by Hughes 2004). Some politicians hope to use discussions of constitutional revision (whether it happens or not) as a chance to move toward a "normal" or militarily stronger nation. On the other hand, Japan has pursued a more multilateral and "idealist" foreign policy on a large number of issue-areas, showing the willingness to break from US positions at the UN and beyond: the landmine treaty, Cartagena treaty, and support for the UN in general. This multilateral strand pushes Japan close to European foreign policy on many dimensions. The tension between these two trends plays out continuously and any equilibrium is unstable. In some instances, the pacifist coalition is granted particular policy goals in exchange for a low profile and the absence of overt anti-US coalition-building. How durable is this pattern? Which actors end up shaping Japan's multilateral agenda and tipping the balance when the two strands of Japanese foreign policy stand in opposition to one another? These questions are particularly important, as Japan is often emerging as the crucial link or pivot on many of the new initiatives (Kyoto, Landmines, possibly GMOs).
A final trend of the 1990s also offers possible explanations for global institution-building. The past 15 years have clearly brought about a globalization of social movements and activism as much as of trade. Most visible in internationally-coordinated protests, social movements increasingly seem to be coordinating more subtle pressure on governments and the global community as well. Agendas - at least in the OECD countries - have been growing more similar and some NGOs have actively re-ortiented their activism to the global public sphere. While this change is less dramatic in the EU and in Canada, Japan has seen the rapid growth and increasing involvement in policy-making of NGOs with links to international movements. While the efficacy of Japanese NGOs is still questioned by scholars [could throw a coupe of citations in here], there is no doubt that the sheer number of active NGOs and social movements in Japan has risen dramatically since the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble and the interruption of LDP political dominance.
Some Plausible Explanations of Causal Forces Underlying Global Institution-Building
Traditionally, the development we are describing has been interpreted by examining states' interests, particularly their narrowly conceived economic and security interests. A realist variant of the examination of states' interests would focus on the formation of a counter-hegemonic alliance ("binding the hegemon"). A liberal variant would focus on the primacy of economic integration and would interpret the above development as facilitating globalization in the interest of all. In contrast, we argue that the clustering of middle powers behind global institution-building arises along two main pathways: differential penetration by global civil society coalitions (H1) and identity formation through a novel foreign policy (H2).
Although the project considers H1 and H2 as the main hypotheses, three more alternatives are considered: balance of power politics (A1), provision of public goods (A2), and domestic politics (A3). This section addresses all five hypotheses in reverse order.
First Alternative Hypothesis (A1): Balance of Power Politics / Realism
Middle powers participate in counter-hegemonic movements in the pursuit of economic and political interests. The process of institution-building is an attempt to constrain the US and to enlarge the voice and maneuvering room for the EU, Japan, Canada, and others. A classic such view is Walt's latest work, Taming American Power (Walt 2005) (For other accounts, see Ikenberry 2002; Mearsheimer 2001). Walt argues that the unprecedented power of the US in world affairs worries other states. They develop various strategies to cope with it. In particular, Walt identifies eight possible counter-strategies by other states:
In particular, Walt argues that the development of multilateral institutions, such as the Kyoto treaty or the landmine treaty can be seen as an effort by other states to bind the US and to balance its overwhelming power.
Indeed, building new institutions may even be an effective tactic when the United States refuses to play along. If the United States chooses not to engage in 'international rulemaking', or if other states become convinced that the United States will reject some new convention no matter how it is written, they may decide to go ahead anyway, without further input from Washington. If their efforts succeed, the United States could end up being at least partly bound by the 'power of the first draft.'(151).Walt also interprets institution-building as an effort to counter US power by deligitimizing the US (as the moral leader of the world). Walt argues that other states choose to impose a political cost on US unilateralism by moving ahead anyway with global institution-building, even when other states know that the US rejection will make the new treaties largely ineffective. Thus, he writes:
By negotiating, signing, and ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, the landmines convention, the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, and so on, the rest of the world is in effect saying to America: 'Sure, you can do what you want, and we can't stop you. But we can make you look bad, and over time, more and more people will yearn for the day when the United States is not so powerful' (163). (On the tug of war with the US over ICC negotiations, see also (Bassiouni 1999; Nolte 2003)
In sum, Walt concludes that the process of moving ahead with Kyoto, the landmine treaty, and others has had a huge impact on the US image and capacity to lead abroad (231).
A realist interpretation would emphasize two more elements: The end of the Cold War and the demise of the bi-polar world have weakened alliance cohesion. In addition, perceptions of US economic dynamism in the 1990s provokes regulatory efforts by economic competitors.
With respect to Japan, a realist interpretation of its efforts toward global institution-building would see such moves as a fig leaf for a deeper trend of Japanese remilitarization and growing assertiveness in its relations with China (See Xinbo 2005 for an excellent Chinese view of changes in Japan's foreign polcy and US-Japan alliance.). In essence, Japan could be seen as seeking greater international legitimacy to balance its growing military development and nationalistic foreign policy.
Second Alternative Hypothesis (A2): Public Goods Provision
Middle powers recognize the necessity for international cooperation in the provision of public goods (e.g., environmental protection, security) (Wood 1988). Possibly because of the absence of claims for global dominance, middle powers are able to focus their foreign policy away from great power competition. In addition, as trading states with deep international linkages, they benefit directly from a stabilization of the global system through international institutions (On the (neo)-liberal/functionalist logic for cooperation in the provision of public goods, see (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane 1984). Global institution-building is therefore a strategically attractive option to achieve solutions to problems that are inherently international. Elements of this reasoning might be related to asymmetries in exposure to global environmental dangers, for example. Thus, environmental degradation and resource dependence (EU and Japan) necessitates strong action.Third Alternative Hypothesis (A3a): Domestic Politics (domestic interests and party politics)
The positions taken by European countries or by Japan, Canada, and other middle powers are the results of particular political alignments and domestic interests. Thus, the push for environmental institution-building by German governments and their subsequent integration into the EU's global agenda are a direct result of the power of the Green party (and its pivotal roles in coalitions) in German politics (Schreurs 2002).The support for Japan's ratification of Kyoto in the summer of 2001 can be interpreted as the result of competition for the urban votes on the even of crucial Upper House elections. Additionally, the Canadian multilateral agenda can be traced to party politics and to the efforts of the Liberal Party to differentiate itself from the traditionally pro-US Conservative agenda. In the EU as a whole, the push toward multilateral institution-building can be traced either to competition between the Commission and national governments, or to competition among coalitions of states (small states and Germany pushing a new multilateral agenda against most realist states such as France and the UK).A crucial variable to consider is the role of public opinion in shaping decisions taken by key middle powers. For example, a 2005 poll in Japan showed both high affection toward the US (stable at 71-75%) and strong support for cooperation with UN efforts to solve global issues (47% of Japanese support participation in peace-keeping, 22% think that Japan should do more (70) Among the important fields for international cooperation through the UN, respondents indicate high support for: peace/security support 71%, anti-terrorism (43%), global environment protection (41%), non proliferation (39%)(79). Source: (Naikakufu (Cabinet office of Japan) 2005 (Heisei 17 nen)). A brand new poll in June 2006 indicated a lower favorable view of the US (down to 63% in 2006) (Japan Times, June 15, 2006. Data from the Pew Global Attitude Report). Polls in Canada and in most EU countries show similar or higher levels (See Pew Global Attitude Survey Data on global issues (global warming, support for the UN). Does public opinion play a direct role in shaping the behavior of middle powers? Or does public opinion operate merely as a latent constraint that must be transformed into a political agenda by political entrepreneurs?
Third Alternative Hypothesis (A3-b) - part b: Domestic Institutions
Middle powers may be spurred toward a multilateral institution-building agenda because of domestic institutional arrangements, such as an electoral system based on proportional representation and prone to produce coalition governments, or a particular foreign policy-making structure.Main Hypothesis 1 (H1): Civil Society Penetration
A global civil society has emerged as a powerful actor in recent years and is championing increased international rights actively (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001; Chan-Tiberghien 2004, Forthcoming 2007; Glasius 2006; Hasegawa 2004; Keane 2003; Mathews 1997; Price 2003; Sasaki-Uemura 2001; Scholte 1999). New Social Movements (women, peace, environment) assume agenda-setting role on the global level. This role is partly based in the emergence of internationally coordinated activities by international NGOs and networks of parallel national policy actors. This global civil society has penetrated the polities of so-called "trading states" most thoroughly and thus puts Canada, the EU and Japan at the forefront of associated efforts. The increased penetration might be due to less entrenched opposition to these new movements. It may also be due to facilitating institutional factors.Main Hypothesis 2 (H2): Identity Formation through Foreign Policy Change (constructivism)
Canada, the EU and Japan all are engaged in on-going processes of foreign policy identity formation and are coming to see multilateralism as the core of their states' mission abroad. In the case of the EU, this commitment to multilateralism may be due to an effort by the Commission and the European Parliament to bring further EU integration through the development of a common foreign policy voice, one that is distinct from traditional French, British, or German voices (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Moscovici 2001; Reid 2004; Rifkin 2004; Schnabel and Rocca 2005; Vogler and Bretherton 2006; Whitman 1998).Japan is going through a similar process of forming a novel footprint on the global scene and to change the relationship between its government and population in the mean time. A decline in Canada's confidence in its peace-keeping abilities and commitments coupled with intellectual debates about the proper role for an increasingly affluent Canada have led to a renewed debate about multilateralism. This pattern may apply to other middle powers engaged in multilateral institution-building and has found its institutional expression in efforts such as the attempt at creating an L-20 group by former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, or in the German and Japanese roles in UN reform proposals. A pattern of supranational entrepreneurialism at the EU and at the UN levels may underpin this identity formation.Case Selection - Countries
The project focuses on the EU, Japan, and Canada as representative significant middle-powers involved in global institution-building (For example, Haass (2005) considers Europe and Japan as the key allies involved in developing global institutions, while also considering three more key powers: Russia, India, and China.).However, the authors are encouraged to briefly consider other relevant middle powers, depending on each case (such as South Africa, Brazil, etc.) as well as middle powers opposed to multilateralism (such as Australia). The goal is to situate the roles played by Japan, Canada, and the EU, in comparison to like-minded and opposite middle powers. The project is open to examinations of other countries in specific issue areas for purposes and contrast and extension.
Regarding three aspiring/emerging great powers, namely China, India, and Russia, the authors are encouraged to briefly consider their respective roles in each case, when relevant.
The Elephant Has Left the Building: the US Role
The last decade of global institution-building is clearly an anomaly in the post-war period. The US disengaged from this process, just when it had unprecedented power to shape international institutions. In fact, Haass made the argument that the US should be leading the process:
The United States, working with the governments of the other major powers, can still shape the course of the twenty-first century and bring about a world that is to a striking degree characterized by peace, prosperity, and freedom for most of the globe's countries and people. (4)
The US "should be using its power and influence to persuade the major powers of the day, along with as many countries, organizations, corporations, and individuals as possible, to sign up and support a set of rules, policies, and institutions that would bring about a world in which armed conflict between and within states is the exception; where terrorists find it difficult to succeed; where the spread of weapons of mass destruction is halted and ultimately reversed; in which markets are open to goods and services and in which societies are free and open to ideas; and where the world's people have a good chance to live out lives of normal span free from violence, extreme poverty, and deadly violence." (17) (Haass 2005)However, as is shown in the above quote, a US-led international institution-building agenda would focus more on issues related to global security and economic management, and less on environment, human rights, cultural diversity, and human security.
Nevertheless, given the unusual pattern of this US absence from institution-building over the last decade and the large impact of this absence on the institutions themselves, chapter writers are encouraged to briefly include an analysis of the US role and of the considerations of US interests by other players.
Case Selection - Issue Areas
The book focuses on all issue areas where institution-building has occurred outside the traditional economic and high security spheres. Cases are selected to include variety in outcome and coalition patterns. As well, some cases such as cooperation on accounting rules are included as contrast cases.
For each case, the book is concerned both with the development of international codes and institutions and some varying degree of implementation of these codes.
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